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RULE 608: EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND
CONDUCT OF WITNESSES
Federal Rule of Evidence 608 states:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility
of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the
form of an opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations:
(1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness
has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or
otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting
the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as
provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which
character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other
witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the
witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined with
respect to matters which relate only to credibility. I
In the federal courts, Rule 608 strictly limits the admissibility
of evidence of a witness' character in order to establish
reputation for veracity. 2 This examination is limited to the
witness' character for veracity, not because other character
evidence is irrelevant, but because inclusion of other character
evidence would create a "substantial risk of a distortion of the
1. FED. R. EviD. 608.
2. See FED. R. EviD. 608 advisory committee's note; see also United
States v. Greer, 643 F.2d 280, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 854
(1981) (finding that inquiry as to truth and veracity is limited to reputation
testimony and that questioning as to reputation in the community is improper).
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accuracy of the fact-finding process." 3 For this reason, evidence
that tends to establish the veracity of a witness "may be admitted
only after the principal witness's character has in fact been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or by other
impeachment evidence which represents an attack on character." 4
The circuit courts have recognized that such testimony under
Rule 608 "must relate to the witness's reputation at the time of
trial--rather than at the time he committed the acts charged."5
The purpose of admitting character evidence is to give the jury
a gauge by which they may weigh testimony elicited in court. 6
Since the inquiry is strictly limited to the witness's character for
veracity, "[t]he impeachment may not extend to an exploration of
the primary witness's general character . . . . "7 This rule is in
accord with the common law prior to the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 8
Rule 608 is not without limitations. Rule 608 expressly
provides that specific instances of dishonest acts may be proven
through cross-examination, but the examiner may not introduce
extrinsic evidence to show that there was a dishonest act. 9
3. GLEN WEISSENBERGER, WEISSENBERGER'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 608.1, at 266 (2d ed. 1995).
4. Id. at 270.
5. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN ON
EVIDENCE 608 03], at 608-23,24. See also United States v. Watson, 669
F.2d 1374, 1382 n.5 (11th Cir. 1982) (concluding that the lower court properly
excluded reputation testimony where an impeachment witness only knew the
person for which she was offering reputation testimony a short duration which
was too remote in time at the beginning of the trial); United States v. Lewis.
482 F.2d 634, 640 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that "one's reputation for
testimonial honesty--whether he be a non-party witness or the accused himself-
-is to be established by evidence of his community reputation at the time of
trial and during a prior period not remote thereto").
6. See United States v. Lashmett, 965 F.2d 179, 183 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that it was harmless error to exclude opinion testimony that the
witnesses "were scoundrels" because the jury already had sufficient evidence
to measure their character and could conclude that the witnesses "were not
paragons of virtue").
7. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 3, § 608.4, at 269.
8. Id.
9. Lashmett, 965 F.2d at 184.
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Although the examiner may not call other witnesses to prove
misconduct after a witness has denied the allegations, the cross-
examiner may continue to press for an admission directly from
the witness. 10 As such, specific instances of misconduct that do
not culminate in a conviction are not provable by extrinsic
evidence. 11 Additionally, Rule 608 prohibits interrogation as to
prior criminal conduct which would violate a witness' privilege
against self-incrimination. 12
Unlike Federal Rule 608, New York evidence law generally
does not permit a witness' character to be proven by opinion
testimony. 13 An exception to the rule exists where "the subject
matter of the testimony [is] such that it would be impossible to
accurately describe the facts without stating an opinion or
impression."14 Thus, New York courts have long held that a
witness' character for truthfulness may be attacked (or once
attacked, supported) only by reputation evidence.15 However,
10. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 5, at 1 608[05], at 49. See also
United States v. Simpson, 709 F.2d 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942
(1983) (holding that the lower court was in its discretion to permit cross-
examination into the defendant's failure to advise his probation officer of his
knowledge of illegal drug transactions).
11. WEINsE & BERGER, supra note 5, at q 608[05], at 34. See also
United States v. Weiss, 930 F.2d 185 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 842
(1991) (prohibiting the use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of
misconduct in order to attack a witness' credibility); United States v. Schatzle,
901 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court did not err in
disallowing the testimony of an arresting officer because such testimony
constituted extrinsic evidence to attack a witness' credibility).
12. FED. R. EviD. 608 advisory committee's note. See also U.S. CONST.
amend. V, which states in pertinent part, "[nlo person shall be... compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id.
13. Kravitz v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Ctr., 113 A.D.2d 577,
582, 497 N.Y.S.2d 51, 55 (2d Dep't 1985). In this case, a witness' opinion
testimony of plaintiff's veracity was held inadmissible because there had been
no prior attack on plaintiff's character for veracity. See also People v. Barber,
74 N.Y.2d 653, 541 N.E.2d 394, 543 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1989).
14. Kravitz, 113 A.D.2d at 581-82, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (citations
omitted).
15. People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 289, 451 N.E.2d 216, 220, 464
N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (1983). See also People v. Tai, 145 Misc. 2d 599, 605,
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this rule has been criticized "because the opinion of a person's
character held by those who know him is clearly probative and
relevant and, viewed realistically, reputation evidence
is . . .often no more than thinly veiled opinion." 16
Another distinction between Rule 608 and New York law
concerns impeachment by specific instances of conduct, Under
Rule 608, specific instances of conduct may not be proven by
extrinsic evidence unless, in the court's discretion, the instances
are probative of "the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness," or "[concern] the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the
witness being cross-examined has testified." 17 Under New York
law, however, courts will allow an inquiry into a witness' prior
bad acts if the acts merely bear on credibility, provided that the
questions are asked in good faith and have some basis in fact. 18
In People v. Sorge,19 the New York Court of Appeals held that
"[a] defendant, like any other witness, may be 'interrogated upon
cross-examination in regard to any vicious or criminal act of his
547 N.Y.S.2d 989, 993 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1989) (holding that
"fundamental fairness requires the admission of negative character evidence to
impeach the character of a non-testifying witness whose hearsay statements
have been admitted").
16. Kravitz, 113 A.D.2d at 582-83, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 55. Because of such
criticism, the Proposed Code of Evidence, if enacted, would allow for opinion
and reputation evidence, subject to two limitations. THE NEW YORK STATE
LAW REVISION COMMISSION, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW
YORK § 608(a), at 131 (1991). First, only evidence referring to the character
for truthfulness may be introduced. Second, such evidence may be admitted
only after the character of the witness has been attacked. 1d.
17. FED. R. EviD. 608(b).
18. People v. Steele, 168 A.D.2d 937, 565 N.Y.S.2d 339 (4th Dep't
1990), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 967, 573 N.E.2d 589, 570 N.Y.S.2d 501
(1991). In Steele, the court held that defense questions pertaining to a
prosecution witness' prior bad acts were properly disallowed where defense
counsel could not establish a good faith basis for the inquiry. Id. at 938, 565
N.Y.S.2d at 339. Currently, this rule disallows questioning of a witness' prior
conduct leading to a criminal charge which results in an acquittal. THE NEW
YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
STATE OF NEW YORK § 608(b), at 132 (1991).
19. 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950).
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life' that has a bearing on his credibility as a witness." 20 More
recently, the New York Appellate Division has also upheld the
right of a party to "impeach an opposing witness by questioning
him with respect to any criminal, vicious, and disgraceful acts in
his life bearing on his credibility." 2 ' The court, in People v.
Jones,22 held that where the witness' credibility is "a critical
issue," it is vital that information of that witness' "capacity for
truthfulness be placed before the jury. "23
The policy reasons for the exclusion of prior bad acts are
substantially similar to those cited for the federal rule and include
protecting the jury from collateral issues which may confuse a
jury, and "avoidance of surprise attacks upon witnesses who
cannot be expected to enter court prepared to defend every act of
their past lives against charges which may never previously have
been made." 24 As the Second Department in Kravitz explained,
"it is both unnecessary and unwise to encumber the trial with a
potential morass of such evidence unless character per se is
disputed."25 Thus, unless an effort is made to impeach a witness'
character and not merely discredit the witness' testimony, policy
considerations require that affirmative evidence to establish good
character be excluded.26
There is a similarity between Federal Rule 608 and New York
case law. Both Rule 608 and New York law prohibit the
20. Id. at 200, 93 N.E.2d at 638 (citations omitted).
21. People v. Jones, 115 A.D.2d 302, 303, 495 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (4th
Dep't 1985) (holding that the lower court erred in limiting the defendant's
inquiry of a prosecution witness' credibility to only "prior bad acts" because
the witness had made prior inconsistent statements and had a criminal history).
22. 115 A.D.2d 302, 495 N.Y.S.2d 823 (4th Dep't 1985).
23. Id. at 303, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 824. See also People v. Ayrhart, 101
A.D.2d 703, 475 N.Y.S.2d 687 (4th Dep't 1984) (overturning the defendant's
conviction because the lower court denied a defense request to cross-examine
two prosecution witnesses whose credibility was at issue).
24. People v. Coleman, 75 Misc. 2d 1090, 1093, 349 N.Y.S.2d 298, 303
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
25. Kravitz v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Ctr., 113 A.D.2d 577.
583-84, 497 N.Y.S.2d 51, 56 (2d Dep't 1985) (citations omitted).
26. Id.
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introduction of general character testimony where only the
witness' character for truth and veracity is at issue. Both federal
and New York cases have held that where evidence for truth and
veracity are introduced, the general character of the witness is
not at issue.2 7 As such, "[t]estimony elicited in rebuttal must be
relevant to the character trait put in issue." 28
While there are some significant differences between Federal
Rule of Evidence 608 and the New York case law, the policy
reasons behind the rules are essentially the same. Fundamental to
both rules is the necessity that the trier of fact be able to
accurately gauge a witness' credibility for truthfulness, while not
confusing the proceedings with unrelated facts or exposing the
witness to attacks not relevant to his or her veracity for
truthfulness.
27. United States v. Darland, 626 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 659
F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982); People v,
Viloria, 160 A.D.2d 499, 554 N.Y.S.2d 163 (lst Dep't 1990).
28. Viloria, 160 A.D.2d at 499, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 164. The court held that
the prosecution's rebuttal testimony. stating that the defendant had "wandering
hands," was prejudicial because the defendant, accused of sodomy, did "not
place his general character in issue" after introducing evidence of his
"truthfulness and honesty." Id.
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